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RACE AND CLASS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
Jennifer Hochschild*
As a discipline, political science tends to have a split personality on the issue of
whether the driving force behind political action is material or ideational. Put too
crudely, White scholars tend to focus on structural conditions as the cause of group
identity and action, whereas scholars of color tend to focus on group identity and
conflict in order to explain structural conditions. More generally, the relevant debate
within political science revolves less around Jacques Demrda versus Karl Marx (as in
critical race studies) than around W. E. B. DuBois versus Thomas Hobbes-that
is, whether "the problem of the twentieth [and other] centur[ies] is the problem of
the color line" or whether people are fundamentally se/f-interested individualists
whose social interaction is shaped by the opportunities presented in a given political
structure.
This Essay examines those propositions by discussing important recent work by
political scientists in several arenas, including ethnic conflict, nationalism, and a
belief in linked fate. I then briefly discuss my own research on the relationship
between race and class, and on the possible malleability of racial and ethnic concepts
and practices, in order to show one way that identity-based and interest-based
political analyses interact. I conclude that material forces drive most important
political disputes and outcomes, but that politics is best understood through a
combination of material and ideational lenses.
* Jennifer L. Hochschild is the Henry LaBarre Jayne Professor of Government at
Harvard University, and Professor of African and African American Studies. She also holds
appointments in the John F Kennedy School of Government and the Graduate School of
Education. Hochschild studies the intersection of American politics and political philoso-
phy, particularly in the areas of racial and ethnic politics and policy, educational and social
policy, immigration, and public opinion on political culture.
Hochschild is, most recently, the co-author (with Nathan Scovronick) of THE
AMERICAN DREAM AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (Oxford University Press, 2003), and the
author of FACING UP TO THE AMERICAN DREAM: RACE, CLASS, AND THE SOUL OF THE
NATION (Princeton University Press, 1995). She was the founding editor of PERSPECTIVES
ON POLITICS, sponsored by the American Political Science Association. Hochschild serves
on the Board of Trustees of the Russell Sage Foundation and the Board of Overseers of
the General Social Survey. Her current research examines racial and ethnic hierarchy in
the United States, seeking to understand ways in which racial classifications and practices
are treated as more or less malleable. The work focuses in particular on skin color differen-
tiation within and across groups and the politics of multi-racialism.
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INTRODUCTION
The discipline of political science tends to have a split personality on
the issue of whether the underlying driving force behind political action
is material or ideational. Put too crudely, mainstream (disproportionately
White) scholars tend to focus on structural conditions such as laws or the
economy, the self-interest of leaders or activists, political incentives, or
even geography in order to explain ethnic identification and conflict.'
Conversely, scholars who study racial politics (disproportionately people
of color), tend to start from racial or ethnic identity and conflict in order
to explain structural conditions, understandings of self-interest, or political
incentives.2 This generalization, like most, is indeed too crude, and one
can immediately identify exceptions; but it is arguably accurate enough to
be a good starting point for further exploration. I develop this argument,
with reference to the most prominent work of political scientists in sev-
eral subfields, in the next two sections below.
Few political scientists, and even fewer in mainstream, high-status
departments, focus on discourse analysis growing out of continental
European philosophy. Most who do are political philosophers whose cen-
tral mission does not include explaining empirical phenomena.3 As a
result, the relevant debate within political science revolves less around
Derrida versus Marx4 than around DuBois versus Hobbes-that is,
1. See discussion infra, in section on "Imagined Communities, Mountainous
Terrain, and Party Mobilization."
2. See discussion infra, in section on "Linked Fate, Panethnicity, Racism, and the
Racial Contract."
3. Important partial exceptions to this generalization include Anne Norton at
University of Pennsylvania, William Connolly at Johns Hopkins University, and Bonnie
Honig at Northwestern University.
4. JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri Spivak, trans., Johns Hopkins
Univ. Press, corrected ed., 1997); KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE
OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling, trans., Electric Book Co.
2001) (1867).
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whether "the problem of the twentieth [and other] centur[ies] is the
problem of the color line"' or whether people are fundamentally self-
interested individualists whose social interaction is shaped by the oppor-
tunities offered in a given political structure.6
This paper begins by examining and illuminating that proposition
through discussion of important recent work by political scientists. I then
briefly discuss my own prior work on the relationship between race and
class, and use my current research to illuminate how tensions between
identity-based politics and interest-based politics play out in academic
political science as well as in actual political arenas. I conclude roughly
where Richard Delgado does: that material forces and access to resources
drive most significant political disputes and outcomes, but that politics is
most fully understood through a combination of material and ideational
lenses.7
I. IMAGINED COMMUNITIES, MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN,
AND PARTY MOBILIZATION
What makes people identify with a nation or some other "imagined
community" larger than any group they can know personally? When do
nationalist antagonisms break out into civil war? How much does racial
identity matter for mobilizing participants in a war or explaining who
votes in peaceful electoral contests?
These questions represent several thriving subfields within political
science. The scholars in these subfields do not engage much with each
other, but they hold two sets of similar views. As the rest of this section
shows, they generally treat racial or any other identity as an outcome
rather than a cause, and they see identity or ideology as frequently less
important than more material characteristics in explicating political action
and outcomes.
Consider the vast, sprawling literature on the growth and practice of
nationalism. One review article of major works analyzing nationalism, for
example, points out that "in constructing an image of a nation, a large set
of variables plays a role: religion, language, law, geographical isolation,
economic considerations, bureaucratic decisions, colonial policies, and the
like."8 A similarly broad and authoritative review article asserts that "a
structuralist likes to explain a 'nationalist' policy response as a reaction to
deeply embedded stimuli located in the international economic division
5. WE. B. DuBois, The Souls of Black Folk, inWRINGs 372 (selections by Nathan
Huggins, ed., 1986) (1903).
6. See THOMAs HOBBES, E-r AL., LEVIATHAN (G.AJ. Rogers & Karl Schuhmann, eds.,
Thoemmes Continuum 2003) (1651).
7. See Richard Delgado, Crossroads and Blind Alleys:A Critical Examination of Recent
Writing About Race, 82 TEx. L. REv. 121 (2003).
8. Yael Tamir, The Enigma of Nationalism, 47 WORLD Pot. 418,421 (1995).
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of labor; voluntarists prefer to find their explanations in domestic upheav-
als:' 9 These arguments point in different directions, but they are united in
placing partial or complete emphasis on material conditions and political
processes to explain the rise or practice of the quintessentially idea-based
identity, nationalism.
Some prominent scholars of nationalism focus particularly on its de-
velopment out of capitalist economies. Ernest Gellner, a Research
Professor at the Central University, Prague, argues in Nations and National-
ism that nationalism results from the imposition of homogenizing
industrialization onto societies previously characterized by small clans,
tribes, or villages. As he puts it, "If an industrial society is established in a
culturally heterogeneous society ... then tensions result which will engen-
der nationalism " ' This scholar has inspired an array of responses,
including another volume dedicated to evaluating and critiquing his
work." One of his most eminent interlocutors, Benedict Anderson, takes
issue with Gelner's particular arguments, but also explains nationalism in
materialist terms. In Anderson's view, the growth of print capitalism-that
is, the drive for profits from books and other printed material once new
technology made printing easy and cheap-and the creation of a consoli-
dated state or rationalized colonial system, in which bureaucrats moved
frequently and developed close connections with one another, were the
two forces that enabled people to "imagine" a "community" considerably
larger than the one they could see.1
2
Political scientists tend to use materialist explanations to explain not
only nationalism, but also the likelihood of conflict between nationalist
groups. Two widely-cited explanations of civil war exemplify this ten-
dency. First, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler argue that individuals make
trade-offs between production and appropriation in deciding whether to
join an ethnic (or other) rebellion. '3 In their view, wars are inefficient, but
they occur because of "three interacting determinants: preferences, op-
portunities, and perceptions."1 4 That is, if people think that they will gain
more by fighting rather than growing crops or working in a factory, they
will fight. Grievances-commitment to or identification with a group or
nation-are only an excuse to justify appropriation rather than produc-
9. Ernst Haas, What is Nationalism and Why Should We Study It?, 40 INT'L ORG. 707,
713 (1986).
10. ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 108 n.1 (1983).
11. THE STATE OF THE NATION: ERNEST GELLNER AND THE THEORY OF NATIONALISM
(John A. Hall, ed., 1998).
12. See generally BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON
THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 41-65 (1983).
13. See Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, 56 OXFORD
ECON. PAPERS 563 (2004).
14. Jack Herschleifer, Theorizing About Conflict, in HANDBOOK OF DEFENSE ECONOM-
IcS,VoL. 1,172 (Kevin Hartley & Todd Sandler, eds., 1995).
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tion. The broader conditions that determine whether a rebellion will be
sustained are also material; they include the strength of the state (meas-
ured by economic wealth), the rebels' ability to extract resources from
local populations or attain them from diasporic sympathizers, the alterna-
tive opportunities offered by the economic structure (including, for
example, the proportion of men with secondary schooling), and the ac-
cessibility of natural resources. Ideology or identity do not matter, or are
(merely) overlays on the ways that interests interact with structures.
The equally influential scholars in the field of comparative politics,
James Fearon and David Laitin of Stanford University, focus more on
politics than on economics to explain the outbreak of civil war."s They
agree with Collier and Hoeffler that people make rational calculations
about when and whether to rebel, rather than being driven by nationalist
fervor or identity-based loyalties. More particularly, in their view, people
make judgments about the capacity of the state to punish them as com-
pared with its capacity to enrich them.Variables such as the state's military
strength, political instability, and the type of regime explain whether peo-
ple think they can evade a state's punishment and therefore can start a
civil war. My (and Laitin's) favorite element of their explanation is the
terrain on which a war might be fought; the presence or absence of
mountains, swamps, jungles, or other rough terrain in which insurgents
can hide or swoop does a lot to determine whether a civil war will start,
persist, and succeed.
16
These are not the only explanations within political science for civil
wars; at least some scholars insist that ethnic loyalties matter much more
than these ruthlessly rational models suggest. Two recent examples are
articles insisting, respectively, that there really are such things as ethnic
wars, which are "fought between ethnic groups over issues that relate to
ethnicity, 17 and that "a focus on dignity, self-respect, and recognition,
rather than a straightforward notion of self-interest, is a better prism for
understanding ethnic and nationalist behavior."18 But the fact that two of
our best young scholars felt the need to insist that identities matter in ex-
plaining political conflict between ethnic groups is a good indication of
how much political scientists tend to argue the opposite.1 9
15. See generally James Fearon & David Laitin, Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War, 97
Am. POL. Sci. REv. 75 (2003); James Fearon & David Laitin, Civil War Narratives, 1-68
(Univ. of Cal., Los Angeles. Working Paper No. 27, 2005), available at http://
repositories.cdlib.org/uclasoc/trcsa/27.
16. Fearon & Laitin, Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War, supra note 15, at 82-86.
17. Nicholas Sambanis, Using Case Studies to Understand Economic Models of Civil War,
2 PERSP. ON POL. 259, 266 (2004).
18. Ashutosh Varshney, Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Rationality, 1 PERSP. ON POL.
85 (2003).
19. See also Henry Hale, The Makeup and Breakup of Ethnofederal States: Why Russia
Survives Where the USSR Fell, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 55 (2005); Kanchan Chandra, Ethnic Parties
and Democratic Stability, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 235 (2005); Daniel Posner, The Political Salience of
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If we move from a broad focus on nationalism and war to a nar-
rower focus on individual identities and peaceful political conflicts, we see
much the same emphasis on material and structural explanations rather
than ideational ones in the mainstream political science literature. The
most prominent analysis of political mobilization and voting argues that
Americans become engaged in politics for three reasons: they have suffi-
cient political resources (ranging from time to leadership skills to money),
they are mobilized by a political party or activist, and they have a strong
enough commitment to political engagement to overcome the inertia of
private life.20 The latter variable is indeed based on ideas and values rather
than on resources and positions; it is comprised primarily of political in-
terest, political efficacy, political information, and partisanship. Thus
political ideas do not emerge from, or reduce to, resources and position in
this model-but they require them for the person to have any political
clout. As the authors put it,
Interest, information, efficacy, and partisan intensity provide
the desire, knowledge, and self-assurance that impel people to
be engaged by politics. But time, money, and skill provide the
wherewithal without which engagement is meaningless. It is
not sufficient to know and care about politics. If wishes were
resources, then beggars would participate.... The resource-
poor are less politically active than those who are better en-
21dowed with resources.
Most importantly here, these authors found almost no independent
effect of group consciousness on political activity. In their initial survey of
15,000 Americans, they asked women, African Americans, and Latinos a
series of questions about their closeness to other members of their group,
their sense of linked fate, and their sense of shared problems. In the fol-
low-up survey of 2,500 respondents (with oversamples of Blacks and
Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas Are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi,
98 AM. PoL. Sci. Pv. 529 (2004) (all three agree that people have identities which make
them inclined to disagree intensely with people holding other identities, but all three
demonstrate that whether disagreement tips into physical conflict depends on political
boundaries and institutions, not on the nature or strength of identities).
A thriving theory in the subfield of international relations, known as constructiv-
ism, arose largely in reaction against the excessive materialism of earlier IR theories such
as realism and neo-liberalism. Constructivism in IR is the closest thing within political
science to the linguistic turn in critical race theory; I do not discuss it here because it has
so far had little to do with the study of race and ethnicity. An article that sets up essentially
the same contrast as I have here (i.e. do structures cause identities or do identities cause
structures?) is David Dessler & John Owen, Constructivism and the Problem of Explanation, 3
PERSP. ON POL. 597 (2005).
20. See SIDNEYVERBA, ET AL.,VoICE AND EQuALITY: Civic VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN
POlITICS (1995).
21. Id. at 354-55.
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Latinos), the authors asked further questions about group-specific policy
preferences and experiences of discrimination. To their (and my own)
surprise, "our efforts did not produce results.... None [of these measures]
had an effect on political activity once measures of resources and other
,,21
aspects of political engagement were included in the equation. In short,
race, gender, or ethnicity-and racial, gendered, or ethnic identification
and perceptions of discrimination-do not explain political activity, at
least in the United States in 1990.
Such a result is not unique to this exemplary study. Verba and his
co-authors point to other studies that also found no connection between
Black racial identity and political activism, once other variables were
taken into account.23 A more recent analysis found that, once one controls
for life circumstances (income, education, age, English proficiency, and
being foreign-born), presidential voting rates among Asian Americans and
Latinos in California "are roughly equal to those of blacks and non-
Hispanic whites."24 Thus non-Anglos, at least in this study, vote for the
same reasons and at the same rate as Whites if they have the same socio-
economic characteristics; "native-born minorities have the same basic cost
and benefit structure as the majority population."25 Still another has de-
termined that among African Americans in major cities of the United
States, "the salience of race recedes with improvements in neighborhood
quality.' 26 These are all materialist models, or at least empirical findings
that material conditions and institutional structures matter more than ra-
cial or ethnic identities and linguistic constructions in determining
27political action.
22. Id. at 355.
23. Id. at 356 (citing Lawrence Bobo & Franklin Gilliam Jr., Race, Sociopolitical Par-
ticipation, and Black Empowerment, 84 AM. POL. ScI. RVv. 377 (1990)); Katherine Tate, Black
Political Participation in the 1984 and 1988 Presidential Elections, 85 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 1159
(1991).
24. Wendy K. Tam Cho, Naturalization, Socialization, Participation: Immigrants and
(Non-)Voting, 61 J. or POL. 1140,1147 (1999).
25. Id. at 1150.
26. Claudine Gay, Putting Race in Context: Identifying the Environmental Determinants
of Black RacialAttitudes, 98 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 547 (2004).
27. For yet more analyses by political scientists showing that institutions and condi-
tions largely determine racial identities and actions, see IRA KATzNELSON, BLACK MEN,
WHITE CITIES: RACE, POLITICS, AND MIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1900-1930 AND
BRITAIN, 1948-1968 (1973); ROBERT C. LIEBERMAN, SHAPING RACE POLICY: THE UNITED
STATES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2005); ANTHONY MARX, MAKING RACE AND NA-
TION: A COMPARISON OF SOUTH AFRICA, THE UNITED STATES, AND BRAZIL (1998); JOHN
DAVID SKRENTNY, TIIE MINORITY RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2002); Paul Frymer, Racism Re-
vised: Courts, Labor Law, and the Institutional Construction of Racial Animus, 99 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 373 (2005); Desmond King & Rogers Smith, Racial Orders in American Political Devel-
opment, 99 Am. POL. Sc. REV. 75 (2005).
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II. LINKED FATE, PANETHNICITY, RACISM, AND
THE RACIAL CONTRACT
The main areas of political science in which one finds fine-grained
attention to racial or ethnic identity as a primary cause of political action
lie in the study of linked fate or racial (ethnic) group consciousness, and
of racism. Non-Anglo scholars have conducted much of this research, es-
pecially on racial consciousness. The central figure in this scholarship is
Michael Dawson of the University of Chicago. In Behind the Mule, Daw-
son uses a 1984-'88 survey of African Americans to show that many
Blacks perceive that their own lives are largely shaped by the collective
fate of their group.2" In his view, that is a rational perception and one
based on self-interest, because despite the recent growth of a genuine class
structure in the Black population, race still profoundly affects Blacks' life
chances. This "black utility heuristic" leads to electoral preferences and
policy views that are much more determined by race than by income or
education, despite the fact that they vary somewhat by class. Dawson's
argument is still firmly rooted in expectations derived from material con-
ditions. But his emphasis on the importance of the perception of linked
fate as an intervening variable between class and political views or actions
moves this work a long way toward an ideational view.
Other scholars have followed up on the idea of linked fate, and
found similarly that a sense of strong racial connection explains much
about Blacks' political behavior.2 9 A few have found a similar sense of
linked fate (often articulated in terms of panethnicity) with corresponding
political impact among Asian Americans,3 ° and among Latinos.31 More
generally, political scientists in this genre study or produce "works that ex-
plore racial/ethnic group attitudes that have clear implications for the
prospects of conflict and cooperation" or "works that look more broadly at
how ideology, power dynamics, and racial hierarchy shape patterns of con-
flict and cooperation. 3 2 Three things are noteworthy about that sentence
28. MICHAEL DAwsON, BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AFRICAN' AMERICAN
POLITICS (1994).
29. KATHERINE TATE, FROM PROTEST TO POLITICS: THE NEW BLACK VOTERS IN AMERI-
CAN ELECTIONS (1993); Darien Davis & Ronald Brown, The Antipathy of Black Nationalism:
Behavioral and Attitudinal Implications of an African American Ideology, 46 AM. J. OF POL. SCI.
239-52 (2002); Robert Brown & Todd Shaw, Separate Nations: Two Attitudinal Dimensions of
Black Nationalism, 64 J. OF POL. 22 (2002).
30. See YEN LE ESPIRITU, ASIAN AMERICAN PANETHNICITY: BRIDGING INSTITUTIONS
AND IDENTITIES (1992); PEI-TE LIEN, THE MAKING OF ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION (2001); Claire Kim & Taeku Lee, Interracial Politics:Asian Americans and Other
Communities of Color, 34 PS: PoL. Sci. & POL. 631 (2001).
31. IAN HANEY-L6PEZ, RACISM ON TRIAL: THE CHIcANo FIGHT FOR JUSTICE (2003);
Matt Barreto, Ethnic Cues: The Role of Shared Ethnicity in Latino Vote Choice, Annual meeting
of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL (2004).
32. Kim & Lee, supra note 30, at 631.
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for this Essay. First, this genre reverses the causal presumptions of the work
discussed earlier about nationalism and civil war, by assuming that racial
attitudes affect or even create conflict rather than that conflict creates ra-
cial commitments. Second and associated, the genre leaves more room for
"attitudes"-that is, for ideas as causal forces-than do the works de-
scribed earlier, although typically even attitudes are part of a list that
includes more material phenomena, such as power and hierarchy. Third,
most although not all of the scholars who study linked fate and paneth-
nicity, and who trace the implications of these group identities, are
themselves non-Anglos. That fact says nothing about the veracity of their
arguments, or about the validity of the arguments of those who focus on
material conditions and institutional structures as causal agents. But it does
provide one more confirmation of the old saw that where you stand de-
pends on where you sit.
The flip side of racial or ethnic linked fate is the study of racism as
an individual or group attribute. There is a long tradition of scholarship
among sociologists and social psychologists, joined by some political sci-
entists, seeking to understand the origins and consequences of Whites'
negative attitudes toward Blacks and other non-Whites. This literature has
four main strands: racism is a consequence of combined racial animosity
and democratic ideals;33 racism grows out of a strong "social dominance
orientation; racism emerges from group interests;35 and what is often
perceived to be racism is actually principled ideological conservatism.
36
The four positions are closely associated with particular scholars, and they
emerge from long and often rather acrimonious interactions among the
advocates of one or another position. They can sometimes be discerned in
the same data sets even though the various analysts insist that the positions
exclusive.37 For my purposes here, two things matterare almost mutually xl . 37proeshrtothnsmte
most: none of these scholars thinks that individual self-interest has much
impact on racial animus,38 and only one of the four strands focuses on any
33. DONALD KINDER & LYNN SANDERS, DIVIDED BY COLOR: RACIAL POLITICS AND
DEMOCRATIC IDEALS (1996).
34. JIM SIDANIus & FELICIA PRATTO, SOCIAL DOMINANCE: AN INTERGROUP THEORY OF
SOCIAL HIERARCHY AND OPPRESSION (1999) (Social Dominance Orientation is defined as
the degree to which individuals desire and support group-based hierarchy and the domi-
nation of"inferior" groups by "superior" groups).
35. Lawrence Bobo, Group Conflict, Prejudice, and the Paradox of Contemporary Racial
Attitudes, in ELIMINATING RACISM: PROFILES IN CONTROVERSY (Phyllis Katz & Dalmas Tay-
lor, eds., 1988).
36. PAUL SNIDERMAN & THOMAS PIAZZA, ThE SCAR OF RACE (1993) (arguing that
what is perceived as racism is sometimes conservative political ideology).
37. See DAVID SEARS, JIM SIDANIUS, & LAWRENCE BOBO, RACIALIZED POLITICS: THE
DEBATE ABOUT RACISM IN AMERICA 1-43 (2000).
38. David Sears & Carolyn Funk, Se!f-interest in Americans' Political Opinions, in BE-
YOND) SELF-INTEREST (Jane Mansbridge, ed., 1990).
FALL 20051
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
sort of interests at all. This is a sharply different view from those described
earlier which seek to explain civil wars and nationalism.
The strongest version of the argument that racial ideas cause institu-
tions and material outcomes is expressed by a scholar who is neither
White nor a political scientist. Charles Mills, in The Racial Contract, argues
that "White supremacy is the unnamed political system that has made the
modern world what it is today."39 The drive ofWhites to attain and retain
moral, political, and economic supremacy has led them to conquer non-
White areas of the world, invent structures that permit domination, and
design an epistemology that hides their control from themselves as well as
from most non-White subjects. Mills insists that his claims are empirically
based and testable, but his view of causation and of the relationship be-
tween ideas and material structures is about as far from, say, that of Fearon
and Laitin as one can get. It is not shared by many political scientists.
III. FixITY AND FLUIDITY IN RACIAL AND ETHNIC HIERARCHIES
Rather than continue this sweep through the political science litera-
ture, let me draw several interim conclusions, and then turn to my own
strategy for reconciling material and ideational frameworks. First, political
scientists focus much more on material causes and structures than does
the new generation of critical race theorists; even scholars who conceive
of race-based attitudes or ideologies as causes place attitudes within a list
that also includes class and power. Second, few political scientists spend
much time thinking about the linguistic connotations of or conceptual
boundaries around "race" or "ethnicity," or much time debating the le-
gitimacy of categories such as Black, Latino, or Asian. Most simply use the
terms as either independent or dependent variables depending on the
nature of their analysis. Third and paradoxically, many political scientists
are just as much or even more social constructivists as the new generation
of critical legal scholars. The difference is that the former see race as con-
structed from material conditions such as the spread of literacy or
industrialization, the location of state boundaries and mountains, the na-
ture of federalism and the constitutional structure, or the level of
economic development. Identities are constructed from structures-not
from language, values, or personal or legal interactions.
Finally, most research in political science lacks the self-conscious
ideological edge that lies at the center of critical legal studies. Material
conditions, structures of power, and the distribution of resources are in-
voked to explain important phenomena, but not usually as the basis from
which to argue that the institutions and distributions ought therefore to
be changed. Work that starts from race and seeks to explain material con-
39. CHARLES MILLS,THE RAcIAL CONTRACT 1 (1997).
40. See generally id.
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ditions typically does have a more critical edge built into it, since most
authors perceive a high level of racial or ethnic hierarchy which they de-
plore. But here, too, political scientists usually strive for a tone of
objectivity or neutrality, and their research is often rigorously quantitative,
so it lacks the tone of revelation and resistance which lies at the core of
most critical legal theory.
IV FACING UP TO THE AMERICAN DREAM: MATERIAL
CONDITIONS INTERSECT WITH IDEOLOGIES
My 1995 book, Facing Up to the American Dream, analyzed how ma-
terial conditions and resources interact with African Americans' attitudes
and values, and how those interactions have changed over time. I exam-
ined the beliefs of the best-off and worst-off third of African Americans
about the ideology of the American dream, racial discrimination and hier-
archy, and optimism about and desire for racial integration from the early
1960s through the mid-1990s. Using public opinion surveys and qualita-
tive evidence, I found that by 1995 poor Blacks had more faith in
American society and in Whites than did well-off Blacks, which was a
reversal from the 1960s--despite the fact that the situation of well-off
Blacks had dramatically improved over those three decades while the
situation of poor Blacks had arguably worsened. In short, attitudes and
values did not track material conditions; in fact, in this case they moved in
the opposite direction.
I described that pattern in the first few chapters. The rest of the
book was devoted to trying to interpret and explain it, and to draw impli-
cations for the practice of American politics. I ended up arguing that
perceptions, measured against expectations, were the key to poor Blacks'
relative satisfaction with their dismal lot and well-off Blacks' increasing
disaffection with their improving circumstances. Unlike 50 years ago, poor
African Americans now live in circumstances in which it is very hard to
see White or societal oppression; if you live in a public housing project
such as the Robert Taylor Homes in Chicago, what you now see are
Black (or possibly Latino) building supervisors, teachers, police, alderman,
sometimes mayor, social workers, doctors, ministers, employers, bankers
etc. You might know that your life is miserable and that your children
have little chance to achieve their dreams, but the people who are shoot-
ing them or not teaching them or not giving you a job are usually no
longer White. Class conflict and racial hierarchy are hard to perceive if
they are not present in one's daily life and if one has a poor education and
gets information mainly from the mass media--so poor Blacks end up
41. JENNIFER HOCHSCHILD, FACING UP TO THE AMERICAN DREAM: RACE, CLASS, AND
THE SOUL OF THE NATION (1995).
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relatively optimistic and satisfied, more by default than by any appropriate
interpretation of their circumstances.
Affluent African Americans, in contrast, have all too many chances
to see racial discrimination and possibly material exploitation. They now
live and work more and more among Whites, and encounter daily abra-
sive hurts. More particularly, they perceive that at least some Whites still
want to deny competitive success to African Americans, even if Whites
will now permit absolute or relative success to members of their race.
That is, most members of White society will now tolerate Blacks' becom-
ing wealthy or even powerful, so long as they do not take over positions
or statuses previously reserved for Whites. Whites exaggerate the "threat"
coming from successful Blacks; conversely, successful Blacks perceive
slights and rejections and disrespect even where Whites do not intend it.
Both sides are excessively sensitive to competition from the other, and
both have good reason, from their own vantage point, to fear being
dominated by the other. In short, class conflict and racial hierarchy are
altogether too visible to affluent and well-educated African Americans
who hope to be treated as the successes they are, expect to be treated un-
fairly, and encounter unfairness often enough to reinforce their
expectations rather than their hopes.
For the purposes of this Essay, the main point is that material condi-
tions and political structures of hierarchy set the terms of the research in
Facing Up to the American Dream-but attitudes and beliefs comprised the
content. For that project, examining neither ideologies nor structures
would have made sense without looking at the other and at the ways that
they intersect.
V FROM RACE TO SKIN COLOR, FROM RACIAL TO MULTIRACIAL:
RACIAL HIERARCHY INTERSECTS WITH RACIAL CATEGORIES
My current research moves deeper into the analysis of both materi-
ally-based hierarchies and the linguistic or social construction of race and
ethnicity. If it works as I hope, it will engage more fully with Delgado's
concern that we examine "the material components of race, and the way
these shape the country's agenda," as well as with "how we talk about,
conceptualize, and narrate these issues."42 My co-authors43 and I are exam-
ining how the United States' racial/ethnic taxonomies and the practice of
racial and ethnic hierarchy are-and are not-changing as a consequence
of high levels of immigration and rapid demographic change, the recent
growth of the Black middle class, the improved standing of Asian Ameri-
42. Delgado, supra note 7, at 11.
43. 1 am writing this book with Traci Burch and Vesla Weaver. They are Ph.D. stu-
dents in the Government and Social Policy Program at Harvard University, and are not
responsible for anything in this Essay.
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cans, the persistent but largely unarticulated impact of skin color on life
chances, the growth of a multiracial political and cultural movement, and
other shocks to older understandings of racial boundaries. Our starting
premise is that these phenomena reveal, and are helping to create, signifi-
cant changes in the United States' racial and ethnic structure, while
simultaneously revealing and possibly helping to preserve some aspects of
the old hierarchies and hostilities.
How much might the understanding and practice of race and eth-
nicity change in the United States in the foreseeable future? That, of
course, is unanswerable; but the scope of possibility is revealed by the
bland statement of the rigorously neutral, ruthlessly empirical newsletter
called Migration News. 4 In the middle of a report of Census Bureau pro-
jections of racial and ethnic categories over the next few decades, the
anonymous reporter added, "It is possible that, by 2050, today's racial and
ethnic categories will no longer be in use." 4 I do not know just what that
writer had in mind, but it is an astonishing idea, at least until one looks at
the long sweep of American history, in which the terms and their refer-
ents have indeed changed considerably.
46
Let us briefly consider two aspects of the unstable racial taxonomy.
Skin color has always been differentiated in important ways within, as well
as across, racial and ethnic groups. In most cases, the lighter the better;
western colonialism reinforced but did not create skin color hierarchy in
Asian and African nations.47 In the United States, for example, my co-
authors and I analyzed the National Survey of Black Americans, con-
48ducted in 1979-80. In a year when Blacks averaged about ten years of
schooling, there is a gap of almost two years between the schooling of the
darkest and lightest African Americans. The same survey showed that
dark-skinned Blacks earned less than seven-tenths as much as light-
skinned Blacks-during a year in which Black families' mean income was
44. Migration News, Census, Welfare, California, New York City, available at http://
www.migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=29940 2_0.
45. Id.
46. See generally GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, RAcIsM: A SHORT HISTORY (2002); MAT-
THEW FRYE JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: EuROPEAN IMMIGRANTS AND THE
ALCHEMY OF RACE (1998); DAVID R. ROEDIGER, WORKING TowARD WHITENESS (2005);
Jennifer Hochschild, Looking Ahead: Racial Trends in the US., 134 WINTER DAEDALUS 70
(2005).
47. See Hiroshi Wagatsuma, The Social Perception of Skin Color in Japan, in COLOR AND
RACE 129 (John Hope Franklin, ed., 1968) for an example of a Japanese proverb that as-
serts, "white skin makes up for seven defects."
48. James S.Jackson & Gerald Gurin, National Survey of Black Americans, 1979-1980
(Computer file). Conducted by University of Michigan, Survey Research Center. ICPSR
ed. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (pro-
ducer and distributor), 1999.
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just over six-tenths of that of White families. Results are similar within
the Latino population of the United States.49
The fact that people with light skin typically have better social, cul-
tural, political, and economic outcomes suggests that racial and ethnic
hierarchy goes even deeper than most scholars of racial structure have real-
ized. However, most people do not recognize their responses to skin color,
do not recognize the impact of skin color on their own lives, or vehe-
mently reject the idea that skin color has or should have any impact on
racial or ethnic politics and commitments. The ideology goes in one di-
rection; the reality goes in another. In short, our research on skin color
effects is showing that the material structures of racial hierarchy have an
impact way beyond what is included in virtually any idealist understanding
of race.
Muldracialism shows some of the same effects. The values placed on
multiracial identity are at present completely mixed, even contradictory and
mutually hostile. Some people of color (and Whites) embrace the new poli-
tics and culture of multiracialism as a means of breaking down the old rigid
color lines, as a way to enable people to recognize and identify with their
fill heritage, as a necessity for good medical care, or as a new frontier for
civil rights advocacy." Others see the embrace of multiracialism as merely
one more attempt by outsiders to undermine Black or Hispanic solidarity,
as a strategy to disrupt litigation or legislation around civil rights, voting
rights, and employment discrimination, or as an underhanded way to dis-
tance oneself from Blackness (or Latino identity) .2 Still others see it as a
pragmatic reality, given rates of immigration and intermarriage, that politi-
cal actors must accommodate as well as they can. 3 Regardless of how one
feels about it, there is growing evidence that the fact of being multiracial
has important consequences for one's life chances. For example, the socio-
econonomic status of biracial children falls, consistently between that of
49. Jennifer Hochschild, et al., Effects of Skin Color Bias in SES on Political Activities
and Attitudes, Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Associa-
tion, Chicago IL (Sept. 2,2004).
50. Jennifer Hochschild, When Do People Not Protest Inequality?: The Case of Skin
Color Discrimination, 73 SocIAL RESEARCH (forthcoming 2006); Jennifer Hochschild, et al.,
Skin Color, Perceptions of Discrimination, and Racial or Ethnic Identity: hat Are the Links, and
"hy?, Presented at the Harvard University Political Psychology and Behavior Workshop,
Cambridge MA (Dec. 11, 2003).
51. Jennifer Hochschild & Vesla Weaver, Racial Classification and the Politics of Inequal-
ity, Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,
Washington D.C. (Sept. 1, 2005); Kimberly DaCosta, Multiracial Identity: From Personal Prob-
lem to Public Issue, in NEw FACES IN A CHANGING AMERICA: MULTIRACIAL IDENTITY IN THE
21ST CENTURY (Loretta Winters & Herman DeBose, eds., 2003).
52. Hochschild &Weaver, supra note 51.
53. KIM WILLIAMS, RACE COUNTS: AMERICAN MULTIRACIAISM & CIVIL RIGHTS
POLITICS chapter 6 (forthcoming 2005).
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their lower status parent and that of their higher status parent. Thus, on the
one hand, the fact of having mixed racial or ethnic ancestry has real, mate-
rial, consequences for one's life-independent of the language with which
we understand that fact."5 But on the other hand, the growth of and contes-
tation around a multiracial movement show that the mere fact of having
parents of different races is politically and personally very different from the
claim of a multiracial identity and community.
6
It is not clear at this point whether our linguistic conventions
("Black", "White," etc.) will or should keep the structures of second-order
discrimination based on skin color mostly submerged. It is equally unclear,
conversely, whether the impact of skin color will help to generate a new
and more flexible language of race (e.g. "dark-skinned Black" or "light-
skinned Asian"). Nor can we tell whether greater attention to variation
within racial and ethnic groups by skin color is more likely to have harmful
effects on racial practices in the United States (by undermining group soli-
darity), or beneficial effects, by drawing attention to the position of the
worst-off.
Similarly, we cannot predict whether the increasing attractiveness of
multiracial identity, combined with the structural changes caused by immi-
gration and intermarriage, will confirm the prediction that "by 2050,
today's racial and ethnic categories will no longer be in use." If that does
happen, its effects could be beneficial or detrimental from the perspective of
racial equity. The optimistic prediction is that loosening the conceptual and
behavioral bounds around "Blacks," "Whites," or "Latinos" will liberate
some individuals and benefit us all. After all, flexibility and malleability usu-
ally open more options for change than do rigid categories; genuinely
treating race as a changeable social construction might generate material
improvements for those at the bottom of the social hierarchy. The pessimis-
tic prediction is that loosening the conceptual and behavioral boundaries
around each group will diminish racial solidarity in disadvantaged groups as
people scramble to escape them, with severe costs to those left behind (or
choosing to remain behind). In this view, insisting that race is a social con-
struction may increase the chances that racial hierarchy will be more fine-
grained and complicated, but will do nothing to improve the material con-
ditions of the worst-off or change the underlying structure of disadvantage.
Thus in my own research, the material bases of racial and ethnic ine-
quality are even more tightly interwoven with the conceptual categories in
54. David R. Harris & Jeremiah Sim, Who Is Multiracial? Assessing the Complexity of
Lived Race, 67 AM. Soc. REv. 614 (2002).
55. David R. Harris & Jeremiah Sim, An Empirical Look at the Social Construction of
Race: The Case of Mixed-Race Adolescents 1-19 (Population Studies Center, University of
Michigan, Research Report No. 00-452, 2000), available at http://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/
pubs/.
56. Kimberly DaCosta, All in the Family: The Familial Roots of Racial Division, in THE
POLITICS or MULTRACIALISM (Heather Dalmage, ed., 2004).
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which we understand race and ethnicity than in my previous work about
the intersection of race and class. Richard Delgado is right to insist that we
should attend much more to "the material components of race:' and even
more correct when he agrees, somewhat grudgingly, that "all of these issues
have a discourse dimension, of course.,,57
CONCLUSION: RACE VERSUS CLASS?
Political scientists arguably pay too little attention to ideas when ana-
lyzing the causes and consequences of group identity and conflict; critical
race theorists arguably pay too little attention to material structures and
differences in power that shape or even create these identities and conflicts.
Exhorting scholars in each group to shift their focus is probably a waste of
time, although exhortations might have an impact on new entrants into
each field. My own research focuses on the interactions between the two
central paradigms, in an effort to avoid one more set of boundaries and
blinders. But, except occasionally, I am under no illusions that I have dis-
covered the right mix of emphases or right causal paths-and others have
told me in no uncertain terms that this new line of research is deeply
wrongheaded.
The most interesting question here is when and how a polity ends up
attending primarily to one dimension of cleavage at the expense of others.
Why do politics and identities in the United States revolve mainly around
race or ethnicity; why do Americans so vigorously deny that they live in a
class-based society? Why do the Irish kill each other over religion, whereas
for several centuries Americans hated the idea that other citizens were Prot-
estant or Catholic but seldom went to war over that fact? Why do Tutsis
suddenly decide that Hutus must be slaughtered, or vice versa, when they
were deeply intertwined through marriage and social life for many genera-
tions? Why did some European nations but not others develop a robust
socialist movement through much of the twentieth century (and why has it
largely died)? Perhaps most interestingly, is Stanley Fish right in asserting
that over the next century, "religion ... will succeed high theory ... and
race, gender, and class as the center of intellectual energy in academe"? s8
Will religion supersede group-based identities in politics as well? If so, a
materialist analysis will have no more purchase in young critical race schol-
ars' choice of research topics than it does now-but that will not mean that
materialism is unimportant, any more than it does now. We live in interest-
ing times, perhaps to everyone's detriment except those of us safely perched
in universities.
57. Delgado, supra note 7, at 151-52.
58. Stanley Fish, One University, Under God?, CHRON. OF HIGHER ED.,Jan. 7, 2005 at
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